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Introduction: 
At midnight on the 12th of December 1963, the Union Jack was lowered for the last time 
at a moving ceremony at Independence Arena in Nairobi, Kenya.  Immediately after, to the 
sound of cheering and jubilation, a green banner emblazoned with spears and shield was raised: 
the national independent flag of Kenya.  For the first time in nearly seventy years, political 
power, in what had been known as the Kenya Colony, belonged to indigenous African people.  
In conjunction with the flag raising ceremony, two separated and differently uniformed 
detachments of African soldiers paraded in front of the packed stadium.  One group wore the red 
fezzes and short sleeveless zouve jackets of the King’s African Rifles.  The other, the dark green 
peaked hats and tunic uniforms of the newly formed Kenya Rifles.1  But this was only for show.  
Legally, there was no difference between the two groups.  With Kenya’s independence; the 3rd, 
5th, and 11th Battalions of the King’s African Rifles were handed over to the Government of 
Kenya and became the 3rd, 5th, and 11th Battalions of the Kenya Rifles.  In the ceremony a 
contingent of Kenya Rifles, dressed in the old uniforms of the KAR, symbolically handed over 
the regimental standards and emblems to their differently uniformed comrades.2  In what was a 
confusing time for the rank and file (and also many of the officers), this was meant to confirm 
for the soldiers, civilians, and government officials of Kenya that the allegiance of the army had 
indeed now changed, but that its pride, competence, and esteem had not. 
The symbolism presented in these ceremonies, particularly the inferred connection and 
legacy between the old King’s African Rifles and the new Kenya Rifles, has proved to be a 
significant omen for some.  Indeed, the relationship between the Kenya Rifles and the United 
                                                          
1 Richard Cox, Kenyatta’s Country (London: Praegar, 1965), 172. 
2 Cox, 172. 
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Kingdom remained strong for many years.  Even today, Kenya sends many of its army officer 
cadets to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, and the British Army maintains a training 
base in Nanyuki, Kenya.3  This has been the United Kingdom’s only long-term military presence 
on the entire continent.  Like most other post-colonial African countries, Kenya faced 
tremendous difficulties upon achieving independence, particularly in the army.  Since 1960, Sub-
Saharan Africa has witnessed over 80 successful military coup d’états.4  Less than two months 
after its independence, Kenya, as well as Tanzania and Uganda (all inheritors of the KAR), 
experienced significant military unrest through the 1964 East African Army Mutinies.  These 
traumatic events and the general difficulties that the Kenya Government faced at the time led 
Kenya to maintain its military ties with the UK.  Through the 1960s and early 1970s, the UK 
financed and trained large portions of the Military of Kenya, particularly the Kenya Army, 
otherwise known as the Kenya Rifles.  This continued relationship between the Kenya Rifles and 
the British military has caused many critics of Kenyan History to issue charges of neo-
colonialism and dependency.      
Several important academics and political commentators have mirrored this sentiment.  
They see British influence on the Kenya Rifles, especially during the 1960s and early 1970s, as 
maintaining the colonial status quo.  They argue that continued British legacies and connections 
prevented the Kenya Army from developing into a modern and representative national 
organization.  Instead, they assert that the early Kenya Rifles operated similarly to the KAR, as a 
colonial army.   
                                                          
3 “The British Army in Africa,” The Army Website, accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.army.mod.uk 
/operations-deployments/22724.aspx 
4 Monty G. Marshall, Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004 a Macro-Comparative Analysis, Report prepared for 
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (Arlington, VA; London: Center for Systemic Peace; Department for International 
Development, 2006), 53-61. 
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In “Structural and Political Change,” historian William R. Ochieng' supports this 
assertion.  He states that “due to the Western and capitalist orientation of Kenyatta and his 
regime, Kenya’s colonial heritage – laws, parliament, civil service, police, army, economy, 
education and provincial administration – remained largely unchanged and unsympathetic to and 
remote from popular wishes [emphasis added].”5  Historian Timothy H. Parsons, in The 1964 
Army Mutinies, echoes this by explaining “The British government’s willingness to supply 
Kenya with technical expertise, extensive military funding, and generous donations of weapons 
and equipment allowed Kenyatta to keep the organization, training, and traditions of the old 
colonial army.”6  This ensured the African government that the Kenya Rifles would be run 
“along KAR lines throughout the 1960s.”7  Most recently, Musambayi Katumanga, a security 
analyst and senior lecturer at Kenya’s National Defence College, argues that the Military of 
Kenya maintained a colonial outlook from independence until the 1990s.   In “Morphing Mirror 
Images of Military Culture,” he states, “instead of seeking to transform [the colonial] mirror 
image structures, [the security institutions] were consolidating it… With a core successor elite 
from the military and police evolving from the rank and file below, independent Kenya adopted 
an essentially mirror image of a military culture.”8  For Katumanga, the early KR was used 
colonially, “to suit the ethnic and class imperatives of the new [indigenous] elite.”9 
The main object of this thesis will be to explore the transition of the Kenya Rifles after 
independence, and the aforementioned controversial relationship between the armies of 
                                                          
5 William R. Ochieng’, “Structural and Political Change,” in Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93, ed. 
Bethwell A. Ogot and William Robert Ochieng' (London: James Currey, 1995), 106.  
6 Timothy H. Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa (London: Praeger, 2003), 169. 
7 Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies, 169. 
8 Musambayi Katumanga, “Morphing Mirror Images of Military Culture and the Nation-State Insecurities in Kenya,” 
in On Military Culture: Theory, Practice and African Armed Forces, ed. Francois Vrey, Abel Esterhuyse, and Thomas 
Mandrup (Clearmont, SA: UCT Press, 2013), 137. 
9 Katumanga, “Morphing Mirror Images of Military Culture,” 137. 
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independent Kenya and the United Kingdom.   In doing so it will be necessary to delve into the 
processes of decolonization, Africanization, and state-building.  These subjects are not only 
important for understanding Kenya, but African militaries in general.  Kenya is one of the few 
countries in Africa to have never suffered a successful coup, and the Kenya Rifles are 
consistently regarded as one of the most professional and highly trained armies on the 
continent.10  Exploring the early years of this specific military force will add insight to these 
observations, and may provide a useful reference for studying other African and post-colonial 
states, their militaries, and their international relations.  The first decade of the independent 
Kenya Rifles can only be understood in the larger context of the King’s African Rifles’ historical 
development.  The KAR, which originated purely for colonial purposes, slowly evolved due to 
indigenous and imperial influences and interests.  At independence, due to the unstable and 
chaotic situation it inherited, the Government of Kenya was forced to act pragmatically and 
flexibly.  First, by ensuring that the Kenya Rifles was a loyal, representative, and effective armed 
force.  And secondly, by pursuing and taking advantage of British military assistance in this 
process, which provided the stability, training, and influence for the future development of an 
organic national army.11 
Because of this, the early Kenya Rifles should not be seen as the simple continuation of 
the King’s African Rifles.  Nor can the early KR be accurately categorized as a neocolonial 
                                                          
10 For examples, see Kibiwott Koross, “Kenya Defence Forces Considered among Strongest, Most Disciplined Army 
in the World,” Standard Digital News (Kenya), October 26, 2013, accessed December 14, 2015, http://www. 
standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000096248/kenya-defence-forces-considered-among-strongest-most-disciplined-
army-in-the-world; The Kenyan Daily Post, “Proudly Kenyan: KDF Ranked the 68th Most Powerful Army in the 
World and 5th in Africa,” The Kenyan Daily Post, March 3, 2015, accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.kenyan-
post.com/2015/03/proudly-kenyan-kdf-ranked-68th-most.html. 
11 Katumanga states that organic military cultures “emerge driven by internal state-building logic.”  He explains 
that organic military culture “is best referred to as the ideal culture, culture as expressed in norms and values 
people claim to believe in.” Katumanga, “Morphing Mirror Images of Military Culture,” 137. 
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institution.  Such understandings not only misrepresent the KR, but they also fail to take into 
account the KAR’s conflicting discourses and evolution.  Instead, this thesis argues that the 
positive forces of evolution in the KAR were maintained by the independent government in the 
KR, thus providing for the future development of an organic national army.12              
This thesis adds to the expanding discourse on African colonial armies and independent 
African military institutions.  Colonial African military institutions have been well documented 
by historians.  This is particularly true of the KAR, whose first major historical account was 
produced by H. Moyse-Bartlett in 1945.  Historians have also written extensively on independent 
Kenya.  Many of these works, such as Charles Hornsby’s Kenya: A History Since Independence, 
analyze Kenya as a whole or focus on its political developments.13 Other academics, especially 
political scientists, have exhaustively explored military developments in post-colonial Africa.14  
Many of these works address the problems of military intervention in domestic politics.  
Nevertheless, despite this wide range of existing research, little has been done to specifically 
focus on the transition of colonial armies immediately after independence.  Even more 
surprising, post-colonial African military research has generally failed to focus on a single 
country or institution, instead opting to compare certain states or analyze Sub-Saharan Africa as 
a whole.  Therefore, conducting research specifically on the Kenya Army, particularly in the 
context of its transition from colonial to independent army, will provide a valuable addition to 
the discourse on African colonial and military history.   
                                                          
12 This thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship between the Kenya Rifles and the British military.  It does 
not assert that the relationship between independent Kenya and the UK lacked neocolonial attributes. 
13 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).   
14 For some examples, see Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and 
Democratic Governance in Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010); Zoltan Barany, “After Colonial Rule in Africa: 
Ghana, Tanzania, and Botswana,” in The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and the Americas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 275-302. 
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Historiography 
 This thesis relies on many important secondary sources for establishing a background on 
African colonial armies and independent African military institutions.  The current discourse on 
African militaries can generally be divided into two disciplines, history and political science. Of 
special importance to the historiography of Kenya’s post-colonial military is Timothy Parsons’ 
1964 Army Mutinies and Myles Osborne’s Ethnicity and Empire in Kenya.  Parsons’ 1964 Army 
Mutinies provides the greatest insight into the Kenya Army’s transition from colonial force to 
nationally independent military.  He shows how the consequences of the 1964 East African 
Army Mutinies greatly affected the future armies of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.  Of particular 
interest is his description of the relationship and dealings between the Kenyan and British 
governments.  While the most extensive historical account of Kenya’s post-colonial army, 
especially with regards to the 1964 East African Army Mutinies, he stops short of examining the 
nature of British training or the changing culture of the Kenya Rifles.  In his analysis, Parsons 
maintains that the Kenya Rifles of the 1960s were independent Kenya’s equivalent to Britain’s 
old King’s African Rifles.  
Myles Osborne’s Ethnicity and Empire provides a comprehensive in depth account of the 
KAR, particularly through the eyes of the Kamba people.  He shows how their military 
contribution to colonial, and later independent Kenya, changed over time.  They made important 
impacts on the KAR, and their legacy of service was influential in post-colonial Kenya.  Osborne 
portrays some of the challenges facing independent Kenya’s Army, particularly the conflict over 
ethnic representation.  While his narrative focuses on the particular experience of the Kamba, 
Osborne’s work is particularly useful in identifying various aspects of Britain’s colonial military 
legacy.   
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 Many important political scientists have also invested their research and efforts on 
Africa’s and Kenya’s military institutions.  The work of J.M. Lee and Musambayi Katumanga 
are especially central to this thesis.  Lee’s African Armies and Civil Order has provided one of 
the greatest and most enduring narratives on the problems facing African militaries, despite 
being published in 1969.  One of the most important issues Lee discusses is the specific 
problems societies and their militaries face when receiving or establishing independence without 
making a clean break from former institutions.  He describes these problems as “The 
Ambiguities of Succession.”15  Lee also analyzes the problems of creating an African officer 
corps, especially with regards to relationships between former colonizer and colonized countries.  
These insights are important for the development of this thesis’ arguments.  Despite Lee’s 
valuable analysis, he does not deeply explore the great diversity of Africa’s military cultures and 
colonial legacies. 
 Musambayi Katumanga provides the most particular and specific account of Kenya’s 
post-colonial military transition.  In addition to being a gifted strategic analyst, he is also a senior 
lecturer at Kenya’s National Defence College.  In “Morphing Mirror Images of Military 
Culture,” Katumanga describes the development of Kenya’s military from the colonial period to 
the modern day.  His account details the Kenyan military in general, in which he includes 
paramilitary and police forces.  Interestingly, he describes the Kenyan security forces as 
maintaining a “mirror image” military culture.  He explains  
Mirror images, as opposed to organic militaries which emerge driven by internal state-
building logic, are driven by the exclusive logic of ruling elite colonial or neo-colonial 
                                                          
15 J.M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (New York: Praeger, 1969), 55. 
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and are core in the deviation of violence and resource extraction.  Such a mirror image 
becomes in effect the reality of the military and culture.16   
For Katumanga, Kenya’s independent military was colonially oriented and changed little during 
its first decades, at least in a technical understanding of mirror image military culture.  While 
Katumanga provides an important political analysis, he fails to note the dramatic evolution the 
KAR underwent before it became the KR.  Because of this, he refrains from pinpointing the 
causes for the KR’s eventual organic development.   
Finally, Mithi Mukherjee’s India in The Shadows of Empire has inspired some of the 
ideas for this thesis.  While specializing in legal, political, and cultural Indian history, 
Mukherjee’s distinction between colonial and imperial ideals and aims has important 
implications for historical research on African colonial military institutions.  Mukherjee states 
that the British Empire “was not a simple and homogenous phenomenon but rather a complex 
one, internally divided between… two competing but also collaborating discourses: the discourse 
of the ‘colonial’, and the discourse of the ‘imperial’.”17  It will be argued that this was true of the 
KAR as well.  Mukherjee explains “the ‘colonial’ was a discourse of governance driven by ideas 
of territorial conquest, power, violence, domination, and subjugation of the colonized.  The 
‘imperial’, on the other hand, was based on a supranational deterritorialized discourse of justice 
under natural law, and was critical and censorial towards the arbitrary exercise of power.”18  
While Mukherjee’s argument pertains to India’s legal and judicial colonial legacies, it will be 
shown that a similar dynamic existed in the KAR, particularly displayed by the competing 
visions between imperial military officers and colonial officials and interests.  This dynamic had 
                                                          
16 Katumanga, “Morphing Mirror Images of Military Culture,” 130-131. 
17 Mithi Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of Empire: A Legal and Political History, 1774-1950 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), xv. 
18 Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of Empire, xv. 
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important implications for the Kenya Rifles and the independent Government of Kenya’s initial 
military policy.      
Primary Sources 
 A wide range of primary sources are used to support this thesis.  Government publication 
collections such as The Kenya Gazette and The Kenya National Assembly Official Record have 
been well used by other historians and provide copious amounts of information about the inner 
workings and debates of Kenya’s government and politicians.  These sources cover a large time 
period from the beginnings of the British protectorate to the present day.  They give insight into 
the inner working of the government, as well as the desires and fears of Kenya’s political elite.  
Other publications produced by important Kenyan leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta and Tom 
Mboya, offer valuable insight into the official mind and rhetoric.  In addition, contemporary 
local newspaper articles produced by the Daily Nation and The Standard provide firsthand 
accounts of important events, and gauge popular opinion and sentiment.   
Finally, sources provided by The Sandhurst Collection present the greatest value.  This 
collection, partially provided by the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, allows access to the 
personnel files of past graduates, of which Kenyan military officers were and continue to be a 
significant segment.  More importantly, this collection provides access to Sandhurst’s military 
magazine, Wish Stream, which has been produced since 1947.  This magazine gives important 
insight into British military training, culture, and the cadet experience.  With this resource, the 
nature of the continued connections between the Kenya Rifles and the UK become clearer.  To 
this author’s knowledge, this source has never been used before in African historical research.  
All taken together, these sources will provide strong support for this thesis and its arguments. 
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Outline 
 This thesis is divided into three main chapters.  Chapter one introduces the predecessor of 
the Kenya Rifles, the King’s African Rifles.  It shows how the KAR evolved dramatically from 
its origin in the late 19th century to the years leading up to independence.  Importantly, the KAR 
was a tripartite institution made up of indigenous (rank-and-file), imperial (officers), and colonial 
(colonial administration/policy) influences and interests.  These influences were often at odds 
with one another, and the conflict between imperial and colonial interests particularly fueled the 
KAR’s initial transformation.  Chapter two explores the political environment and needs of the 
Government of Kenya.  It establishes that Kenya could not afford to disband or completely 
rebuild the KR, nor could it sacrifice the KR’s reliability and efficiency.  It immediately required 
the KR to deal with various internal and external threats while remaining professional and loyal.  
Chapter three explores the post-independence relationship between the KR and the British 
military.  It shows how British military aid was the best option for the KR’s unique needs.  This 
assistance was important in maintaining the KR’s loyalty and efficiency, as seen by the 
significant positive impacts made by British trained Kenyan KR officers.  British officer imperial 
ideals were central to the success of this aid. The stability, training, and influence that British 
military assistance provided enabled the KR to stifle its own neocolonial discourse, and 
eventually develop a national organic military culture. 
***** 
 There may be some confusion regarding the terms and abbreviations used throughout this 
thesis.  The King’s African Rifles, or KAR, was the British Empire’s predominant military force 
in East Africa.  The Kenya Rifles, or KR, was and is independent Kenya’s army.  Kenyan 
sections of the KAR, became the KR at independence.  While the Government of Kenya uses the 
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title Kenya Rifles and Kenya Army or Army of Kenya interchangeably, for the purpose of this 
thesis, Kenya Rifles will be the predominant term.  Importantly, the Kenya Rifles or the Kenya 
Army never referred to other forces such as the GSU (General Service Unit), Tribal Police, or 
regular police.  As the Government and Military of Kenya use the term Kenya Rifles, as opposed 
to Kenyan Rifles, the former will be maintained.  Finally, it should be understood that Kenya’s 
colonial government was a separate entity from Britain’s metropolitan government.  While both 
were components of the British Empire, they often had conflicting visions and policies.  
 
Chapter 1: The King’s African Rifles 
Before analyzing the development of the independent Kenya Rifles, it is first necessary to 
understand its predecessor. The King’s African Rifles was the British Empire’s primary military 
force in East Africa.  Along with other colonial formations such as the India Army and Royal 
West African Frontier Force, it was instrumental in expanding and maintaining Britain’s imperial 
rule.  Consisting of indigenous African soldiers and British officers, the KAR played a major 
role in many difficult campaigns in East Africa and abroad. Originating in the final decades of 
the 19th century, the volunteer force took part in significant conflicts such as World War I, World 
War II, and the Mau Mau Emergency.  In World War II, it fought as far away as Madagascar, 
Malaysia, and the Middle East.  In the early 1960s, during the dissolution of the British Empire, 
it was finally broken up and handed over to the newly independent governments of Malawi, 
Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya.  
The KAR’s development was influenced by three different interests, which can generally 
be described colonial, imperial, and indigenous.  Colonial interests, represented by the Colonial 
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Office and the East African colonial governments, were mostly concerned with economic 
extraction and maintaining internal rule and stability at the lowest cost. Imperial interests, 
represented by British military officers, generally wanted the KAR to be a professional (even 
prestigious) and conventional force capable of defending the empire.  Indigenous interests, 
represented by the rank-and-file, desired to shape the KAR and their terms of service for their 
own benefit.  Throughout its history, the KAR changed and evolved dramatically as it was 
impacted by these influences.  This was particularly the case due to the disparity of vision for the 
KAR’s development between colonial officials and imperial military officers.  This chapter will 
make clear that the purpose, identity, and essence of the KAR was not singular, and that as it 
developed the KAR began to transform from a ‘colonial’ to an ‘imperial’ institution.  This 
evolution and these influences would have significant legacies for the new independent Army of 
Kenya.   
The original purpose of the KAR was colonial inspired, or in the words of Mukherjee: 
“articulated and operated in terms of conquest and domination of the colonized.”19  In the last 
decades of the 19th century, private European companies and individual traders, with or without 
formal British or other imperial connections, began colonial operations in East Africa.   An 
important former general of the KAR, George Giffard, explained that these business interests 
“were compelled, in order to maintain order and protect their stations, to raise local forces.”20  
But these forces also had an offensive purpose.  Parsons states that early colonial officials and 
agents “needed an armed body of men to impose their will on the local population.”21  These 
                                                          
19 Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of Empire, 7. 
20 George Giffard, foreword to The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 
1890-1945, by Hubert Moyse-Bartlett (Eastbourne: Rowe, 1945), v. 
21 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King’s African 
Rifles, 1902-1964 (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 14. 
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units, which were originally largely composed of foreign Muslim veterans from Sudan and 
Egypt, where effective in expanding British control and coercing the indigenous African 
population.22  Parsons explains that their “primary mission was to force East Africans to 
surrender their sovereignty, and it was imprudent to recruit askaris [colonial soldiers] from the 
same African communities targeted by British military operations.”23  While effective in 
protecting business interests and small-scale colonial conquests, these inexpensive units had little 
value as a conventional force.  Giffard describes them as “scantily equipped levies armed with 
out-of-date rifles discarded by the Army and employed on local expeditions against ill-armed 
tribes.”24  Indeed, these soldiers were not well treated and a contingent in Uganda “rebelled in 
1897 to protest infrequent pay and excessive campaigning.”25  While these forces had not yet 
become the KAR, their original purpose of local conquest and control, as designed by local 
colonial interests, would prove to be an important beginning.   
The first years of the 20th century would see the unification of these forces and the formal 
development of the King’s African Rifles.  The original quasi-private armies slowly gave way to 
governmental control as the various companies surrendered their charters to Britain’s Foreign 
Office.  By 1902, the Foreign Office had created the Central African Rifles, the East African 
Rifles, and the Ugandan Rifles, which they combined to form the KAR.26  In 1905, the Colonial 
Office took overall command of the KAR, but gave responsibility for the individual battalions to 
the East African colonial governments.27  This was an important development, as colonial 
                                                          
22 The East African colonial governments also relied on Britain’s India Army for a time. Parsons, The African Rank-
and-File, 14-15. 
23 Parsons, 15. 
24 Giffard, foreword to The King’s African Rifles, v. 
25 Parsons, The African Rank-And-File, 15. 
26 Parsons, 16. 
27 Parsons, 16. 
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interests would continue to heavily control the KAR’s future. Equally important however, was 
the formalized relationship with the British military, which provided an official command 
structure consisting of regular British officers holding the King’s or Queen’s commission.28  This 
introduced an imperial influence which would grow in importance in the years to come.  Despite 
these reforms, the purpose and role of the KAR, as dictated by colonial officials, remained 
largely the same.  Between 1902 and 1914, the KAR carried out “punitive” expeditions against 
various indigenous groups including the Kikuyu, Embu, Kisii, and Turkana, to name a few 
examples.29  The KAR was also used to intimidate various indigenous groups to pay taxes or 
otherwise submit to colonial authority.  H. Moyse-Bartlett, former KAR officer and author of 
The King’s African Rifles, the semi-official history of the organization, describes how the 
“protective and preventive function exercised by the mere presence of disciplined troops” could 
settle colonial matters “without the use of force.”30  While the new official British commissioned 
officer command structure wished to make the KAR “into a modern military formation, capable 
of undertaking full-scale, battalion level operations,” settler and colonial influences mostly 
prevented this development at this time.31    
But World War I would initiate dramatic changes in the KAR, particularly in terms of 
recruiting and the introduction of direct indigenous influence.  While some Sudanese veterans 
remained in the force, during World War I, the ethnic composition changed drastically as local 
indigenous Africans became the primary recruits.  At the onset of World War I, British East 
                                                          
28 Before the formalization of the KAR, not all officers were regular or serving British officers.  After this point, 
overall officer qualifications began to improve.  See Anthony Clayton, The British Officer: Leading the Army from 
1660 to the Present (London: Pearson, 2006), 224. 
29 Hubert Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-
1945 (Eastbourne: Rowe, 1945), 204-215. 
30 Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles, 206. 
31 Timothey Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 16. 
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Africa officials found themselves ill prepared to face German Tanganyika forces.  While hesitant 
to risk the façade of white superiority and invincibility, the colonial governments began to rely 
on the KAR (at the encouragement of British officers) and thus increased the size of the force by 
recruiting indigenous Africans from their own colonial territories. 32  While many difficulties and 
tragedies characterized the East African Campaign, locally recruited African soldiers of the KAR 
proved to be very capable, and they would be used from then on.  Importantly, this shifted the 
KAR’s demographic composition from foreign to local.  KAR authorities now needed to be able 
to better meet the demands of their soldiers in order to make service worthwhile and attractive 
for suitable indigenous recruits.  
This was a major source of development as indigenous soldiers now directly influenced 
the King’s African Rifles.  This not only led to significant changes in the KAR, but it also 
increased tensions between colonial officials and imperial military officers, the latter of which 
were inclined to accept their soldiers’ demands as long as it ensured the reliability and 
effectiveness of the force.  Indigenous soldiers influenced the nature of KAR and their terms of 
service through manipulating British ideas of ‘martial race,’ leveraging their willingness to 
accept discipline, syncretizing British military ideals and practices with local African values and 
traditions, and impacting the comportment of their officers.  
Indigenous soldiers first influenced the King’s African Rifles though recruitment 
practices.  Recruitment into the King’s African Rifles must be understood as a discourse between 
potential African soldiers and British authorities.  Colonial and military officials generally 
understood this discourse or dialogue through erroneous theories of “martial race.”  Largely 
                                                          
32 Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles, 332-333. 
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based on experiences in India, colonial military authorities believed that certain ethnic groups or 
tribes were inherently better suited for military service.  However, Parsons explains that 
“Although portrayed by British officers as an innate cultural attribute, in reality martial race 
signified an acceptance of military discipline.”33  Because of this, conceptions of martial race 
were always static as indigenous individuals responded to military recruitment in different ways 
at different times.  Thus British ideas on martial race were beholden to indigenous agency.  
Individuals and communities could even use labels of martial race for their advantage.  In his 
important study of the Kamba and their experience of empire, Myles Osborne explains, “local 
leaders could use that military reputation [martial race] to pressure the colonial government in 
Kenya for benefits, and also attempt to solidify positions of authority at home by bolstering their 
social standing.”34 Recruitment and ideas of martial race were not only used by colonial and 
military officials to understand and recruit in East Africa, but also by indigenous communities to 
seek colonial and societal concessions.   
Indigenous soldiers also directly leveraged their British officers to negotiate their terms 
of service.  Generally speaking, African members of the KAR did not join out of notions of 
loyalty or sense of duty to the British Empire or the Kenya colonial government.35  Parsons 
explains that the majority signed up “because military service was the most lucrative form of 
unskilled wage labor in colonial East Africa.  Most African soldiers thought of soldiering as 
prestigious work that entitled them to special consideration from the army and, consequently, the 
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colonial state.”36  These concessions were not concrete or freely given however, and KAR 
soldiers used their willingness to accept discipline and risk, to impose their demands on their 
officers.  Parsons explains that this was done through various means “ranging from minor 
violations of standing orders and regulations to a few mass strikes by entire units during the 
Second World War.”37  Due to the mortal dangers, strict discipline, and other peculiar burdens 
soldiers faced in the army, they demanded and were given special considerations by military 
authorities, such as relatively lucrative pay and enhanced prestige.  However, the colonial 
government and settler population often resented this treatment, as they feared that African 
middle class veterans with special statuses would undermine the colonial social order.38 Imperial 
officers created tension with colonial authorities by acquiescing to indigenous rank-and-file 
demands.  While Parsons has noted that these concessions may have created praetorian trends in 
the KAR, it is important to understand that many modern societies also specially distinguish 
active and retired service members.39  The King’s African Rifles was created by colonial 
interests and imperial influences, but that did not stop indigenous soldiers from imposing their 
own desires on the force.  
Indigenous African soldiers not only negotiated for concessions, they also directly 
influenced the nature or culture of the KAR.  Parsons states that the shift in recruiting and new 
indigenous composition made the KAR “first and foremost an African institution.”40  While 
colonial settler demands and British military influences and organizations were important, 
“Ultimately, the military culture of the KAR evolved from the daily interaction of Western and 
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African values.”41  While on campaign, African soldiers sang African songs they specially 
adapted for marching.42  When burying the dead, including alongside their British comrades, 
they personally performed special indigenous ceremonies or rituals depending on whether the 
deceased was Animist, Christian, or Muslim.43  They translated traditional British military ideals 
such as loyalty, duty, and honor into similar albeit different local understandings.44  Importantly, 
they valued their martial prowess and success and eagerly passed on their pride to their 
communities and new members.  Despite being constrained by the rigid structures of military 
discipline and colonial exclusion and exploitation, African soldiers significantly influenced the 
KAR’s culture. 
The KAR’s indigenous soldiers also impacted their British officers.  They expected 
consistent and fair treatment, as well as respect.  British officers who conformed to the 
expectations of their soldiers developed “a sophisticated understanding of African languages and 
customs through extended contact with askaris and recruiting visits to their home areas and 
developed strong, albeit paternalistic, emotional attachments to their men.”45  A former British 
Somaliland official noted that a good officer of an African colonial unit knew not only their 
soldiers’ “regimental numbers, he knows how many children they have as well, or what songs 
they sing when the rain comes.”46  KAR officers and their men also developed unique systems of 
negotiation and reconciliation.  Ngomas and Barazas, heavily African influenced KAR 
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celebrations and ceremonies, allowed officers and soldiers to interact in culturally meaningful 
ways that allowed room for equal dialogue.47  While such institutions worried some officers due 
to their discouragement of military hierarchy, they were defended as being an innate part of the 
KAR.    Good officers were well appreciated, and veteran soldiers often remained in contact with 
and honored their former officers.48  However, this was not always the case as the KAR 
sometimes attracted bad officers, especially during its early years.  There are instances of 
widespread dissent and even fragging in World War II.49  While colonial societies and 
institutions were constructed with racist prejudices, it is important to understand that army life 
and the rigors of combat could provide a stark knowledge of reality to officers and men.  During 
such times, Africans and Britons lived together in close quarters and shared certain experiences 
which shattered colonial or racial myths.  In his detailed study of Britain’s African forces in 
World War II, David Killingray states “Military action involving mutual dependence of men and 
officers overrode barriers of race and class that were impenetrable in peacetime; there is much 
evidence of close working relationships between African soldiers and their white officers 
especially on the battlefield.”50  British officers and the KAR could not have been successful 
without meeting the expectations of their soldiers, sometimes needing to act outside the narrow 
constraints of colonialism and racism.  
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Good British officers not only conformed to the desires of their men, many of them also 
advocated for greater rights and promotions for KAR soldiers.  This was especially true of 
NCOs.  African NCOs played an important role in shaping the KAR, and they were highly 
trusted by their British officers.  Killingray explains that “African NCOs held positions of 
considerable influence… Senior NCOs occupied key positions, acting as arbiters, negotiators and 
translators... they were men to whom first referral was often made in dealing with disputes 
involving rank-and-file.”51  Indeed, Parsons has noted how “Many British officers who served in 
combat with senior African NCOs and WOPCs [warrant officer platoon commander] firmly 
believed they were qualified for commissions, but intense political pressure from the settler 
community maintained the racial segregation of the colonial officer corps.”52  The 
aforementioned WOPC is a testament to the prowess of African NCOs in the KAR.  It was a 
platoon commander position created especially for Africans, by senior army officers, due to the 
need for competent leadership.  While not technically commissioned, WOPCs held the same 
responsibilities usually reserved for lieutenants and captains.53  African NCOs helped lead the 
KAR as well as translate the wishes, desires, and expectations of British officers to African 
soldiers, and vice versa.  African NCOs may have been the most integral and indispensable part 
of the KAR.54  Indeed, many became important leaders and officers in their respective armies 
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after independence.  Indigenous Africans played important leadership roles in the KAR, and 
British officers pressured and started the conversation for establishing an African officer corps.55 
Indigenous soldiers’ influence and demands were largely supported by British officers 
because the given concessions agreed with their imperial ideal of a professional and prestigious 
military force.  Generally speaking, British officers were highly influenced by ideals of honor, 
duty, and exceptionalism.56  They had a personal stake in their force’s welfare, strength, and 
prestige.  Thus, they were willing to give concessions that ensured the effectiveness and 
reliability of KAR soldiers.  British military ideals also meant that officers often saw little need 
for, or glory in, policing the civilian African population.  This conflicted greatly with colonial 
interests.  Parson explains that “The British Army has always had a particular distaste for 
operations ‘in support of the civil power’ requiring the use of lethal force against civilians.”  This 
was true in East Africa as well.  Moyse-Bartlett, historian and retired KAR Lieutenant-Colonel, 
explained that senior KAR officers “stoutly maintained their opposition to the attitude of mind 
that permitted the… [KAR] to be used as a species of superior police in support of frontier 
administration.”57  British officers were motivated by an idealistic vision of the empire and its 
future, and they sought to make the KAR conform to and take part in that endeavor.  Most KAR 
officers also genuinely desired the best for their men, and they wanted the KAR to become more 
like a professional regular army, instead of a colonial formation.  Thus they were willing to give 
certain concessions to their soldiers that were in line with European practices, such as increased 
pay and prestige.  They did not have the same financial or governmental concerns as colonial 
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officials and the settler population; instead their greatest loyalty was for their particular units and 
the empire.58  As such, KAR officers were often opposed by colonial interests in their effort to 
transform the organization from a colonial force into a modern, effective, and prestigious 
imperial formation. 
From the onset of direct imperial influence, colonial interests strove to maintain the 
KAR’s original internal control and domination oriented mission.  As has been noted, the East 
African colonial governments were forced to rely on the KAR for external defense during World 
War I.  Afterwards, they only grudgingly accepted the concessions military officers advocated 
for the indigenous troops.  Colonial interests not only tried to limit the concessions given to 
indigenous soldiers, they even tried to disband the KAR or turn it (back) into a “body of armed 
constabulary.”59  This led an irritated Colonel J. Harington to state, “settlers in Kenya… do not 
appear to regard the force [KAR] maintained there as a small contribution to the defence of the 
Empire, of which the Colony forms a part.”60  Moyse-Bartlett noticed this discrepancy between 
colonial and imperial visions, stating “despite the insistence of Whitehall that the K.A.R. was 
essentially a military force, the view was still current in the Colony that its proper role was that 
of a frontier police.”61  Even after World War II, during the menacing environment of Cold War, 
the colonial governments refused to offer greater support for the KAR, instead planning to make 
do with newly formed paramilitary units (including what would eventually become the GSU).62   
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However, KAR officers continued to champion “an efficient military force commanded 
by professional soldiers and charged with the joint defence of all the territories.”63  But Colonial 
interests resented having to pay for the KAR as they “believed public funds should be spent on 
loans and subsidies to help [settlers].”64  Indeed, the colonial governments even tried to rescind 
or eviscerate various privileges or benefits given to indigenous veterans.  For example, Parson 
notes that during 1950s the East African colonial governments held off on, and eventually only 
grudgingly approved, increased pensions and wages, despite soaring growth in the cost of 
living.65  Consequently, the KAR had enormous difficulty during this time “to make serving in 
the army appealing to Africans.”66  This was a difficult period for the KAR, as imperial budgets 
dried up and independence loomed large.  Despite this however, it was planned “to preserve the 
core of the KAR as a viable military force.”67  As British officers prepared for independence in 
East Africa, they worked “to ensure that the new African armies would inherit the organization, 
traditions, and philosophy of the [KAR] intact.”68     
* 
  The King’s African Rifles was a complex institution which evolved from colonial, 
imperial, and indigenous influences.  While a tool of the British Empire, it was significantly 
impacted by its indigenous soldiers.  These soldiers not only negotiated their terms of service, 
but they also directly influenced the culture and leadership of the KAR.  British officers had to 
adapt and sometimes defer to their KAR soldiers in order to maintain the effectiveness of the 
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force.  Equally important, was the conflict between colonial officials and imperial military 
officers over the purpose or mission of the KAR.  Its original purpose, as dictated by colonial 
interests, lay in conquering, coercing, and intimidating the indigenous population of East Africa.  
However, as control became more formalized and regular British officers became more involved, 
the KAR changed dramatically.  British officers strived to increase the professionalism and 
prestige of the force.  They wanted it to become an imperial force used against outside 
conventional threats, instead of for internal policing and domination.  Due to the KAR’s success 
in World War I, and then the threats that World War II and the Cold War presented, this imperial 
vision eventually won out.  But such an outcome was not guaranteed, and colonial interests, due 
to financial and governmental concerns, constantly tried to return the KAR to its colonial origin.  
These influences and conflicts of vision would have important implications for independent 
Kenya and the Kenya Rifles.    
 
Chapter 2: Fighting for Survival in the Frenzy of Independence 
 When Kenya achieved independence on December 12, 1963, it inherited an incredibly 
unstable and perilous political situation.  Harold MacMillan’s famous “Winds of Change” speech 
in 1958, and the speed with which Kenya’s independence was planned, caught British military 
officials off-guard.69  As such, the Kenya Rifles was not yet ready for independence in late 1963.  
Certain important tasks, such as the Africanization of the officer corps, had yet to be 
accomplished.  In addition, the KR’s configuration was still composed along British theories of 
martial race.  But the biggest challenge Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta faced was to unite the 
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many diverse peoples of Kenya whose only commonality was the shared experience of 
colonialism.70  Indeed, the biggest threat to the new independent Government of Kenya was from 
its own institutions and people.  The Government of Kenya faced the full force of desire and 
expectation by people who had been systematically marginalized for over fifty years.  In 
addition, Kenya inherited a wide range of external threats.  The end of the major European 
empires in Africa created a volatile and precarious continental diplomatic environment in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Politically unstable and expansionary neighboring states threatened Kenya’s 
sovereignty.  Even more concerning was the Cold War, in which Africa was caught in the 
middle.  To combat these problems and maintain its rule and integrity, the Government of Kenya 
was forced to act pragmatically by ensuring that the Kenya Rifles was a loyal, representative, 
and effective independent army. 
 This chapter describes the threats that independent Kenya faced, and the steps the 
government needed to take in order to counter them.  It begins by explaining the internal and 
external threats to the KR’s loyalty and reliability.  It then details a related problem, the 
necessary reforms the KR needed to immediately undergo to make itself more representative and 
acceptable to the public, as well as the tensions those reforms created.  The chapter ends by 
describing the security threats to Kenya’s sovereignty and ability to rule.  Violent conflict 
involving internal ethnic groups, and the threat of invasion by foreign powers, meant Kenya 
could not afford to disband or completely rebuild the KR.  It needed to be able to immediately 
rely on an effective KR, in order to defend its sovereignty and maintain its rule.  Therefore, the 
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situation the Government of Kenya inherited forced it to ensure the loyalty, representativeness, 
and effectiveness of the KR. 
The loyalty and reliability of the Kenya Rifles was one of the most important concerns to 
Kenyatta and his government.  They rightfully recognized the dangers a standing army could 
present.  Generally speaking, the greatest threat newly independent African governments faced 
were military coups or other forms of military intervention in civil politics.  One study has 
recorded that by 1985, post-colonial African states had suffered sixty coups and 197 attempted 
coups or military conspiracies.71  Kenya’s politicians and government were well aware of these 
developments.  Indeed, less than two months after independence, in an event that will be 
discussed in greater detail further on, the 11th KR staged a military mutiny along with other 
former KAR battalions in Uganda and Tanzania.  While the issue was peacefully resolved in 
Kenya, Parsons explains that the “military unrest shook the foundations of civil authority in the 
region and sparked a crisis of confidence in Great Britain and the new African governments.”72  
Order was restored but trust was not. 
While the 1964 Army Mutinies were generally forgotten or explained away as an 
innocuous misunderstanding, Kenya’s politicians and government remained concerned over the 
reliability and loyalty of the Kenya Rifles.73  They had observed violent coups occur in other 
parts of Africa, and they feared for the same in Kenya.  In one parliamentary session, M.P. Omar 
stated  
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I would like to remind our Ministers about the political atmosphere in Africa, particularly 
in countries where there have been coups by the military or the army.  Now, our country, 
Kenya, is good; its political stability at the moment is good, but that is not enough.  We 
would like the Government to ensure that our Army and the police are satisfied… if they 
are not satisfied, then they will be tempted to do the same as has happened in Ghana, 
Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa.74  
Indeed, some members of Kenya’s government and parliament feared that the KR had already 
become disloyal.  The Minister for Internal Security and Defence allegedly told the Daily Nation 
that “in a [Kenyan] army barracks… there are people in our midst who would like to overthrow 
the Government.”75  M.P. Ngala echoed this stating, “This is a more serious matter, to have in 
the army… people who are alleged to be trying to topple our own Government.”76 While such 
fears were probably exaggerated, there were signs of worrying behavior.  M.P Ochwada, a KAR 
veteran, informed the house that “at the present moment you find there are a lot of rumors going 
on about in the army as to what they intend to do, what might happen if this or that was done and 
so on and so forth.”77  While historians have debated the evidence for such developments, the 
fear that the KR was or could be coopted was genuine, and the government was forced to react. 
 Subversion by a foreign power was thought to be one of the primary threats to the Kenya 
Rifles’ reliability and loyalty.  As the international situation at the time was generally divided 
between East and West, communism and capitalism, individual fears and accusations from 
Kenya’s politicians developed along these lines.  As with many other governments of the time, 
the Soviet Union and communism were often thought to be a significant threat.  M.P. Okando 
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illustrates this when he stated to parliament that “there are evils of which we must be aware, and 
one of those evils in this country to which we must be completely awake is the advent and 
infiltration of communism in many different forms.  By support, financially or otherwise, 
communism is certainly getting into this country.”78 Yet many of Kenya’s politicians feared the 
opposite.  M.P. Anyieni expressed this concern when he cautioned the Government that 
There are a lot of coups d’etat which are taking place in Africa today and, if we analyse 
these coups d’etat properly, we will find that they are imperialist inspired… The 
Government must guard against any foreigners approaching our people in the army in 
order that our army may remain loyal only to the Kenya people and not to imperialist 
forces or any other forces for that matter.79 
While members of parliament and government officials disagreed upon who was a greater threat, 
they all recognized that the KR was vulnerable to foreign cooption.  Such fears led to a greater 
effort to confirm and maintain the KR’s reliability and loyalty. 
 The Government of Kenya was also concerned that the KR could be subverted by internal 
interests.  While most of Kenya’s politicians had been united against continued British rule, 
bitter disagreements over Kenya’s independent future often led to deep-seated mistrust and 
animosity.80  One example of this is the relationship between Jomo Kenyatta and Paul Ngei.  
While they had been imprisoned together during the Mau Mau Conflict as part of “The 
Kapenguria Six,” after their release and as independence approached they became bitter 
enemies.81  Osborne explains that Ngei became “a political thorn in Kenyatta’s side,” and that at 
                                                          
78 Hansard, Government of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates Official Report Volume XC, 16 October- 20 December 
1962, (Nairobi, 18 October 1962), 149. 
79 Hansard, Republic of Kenya, House of Representatives Official Report Volume VIII, 25 January- 10 March 1966, 
(Nairobi, 10 March 1966), 1969. 
80 In the first years of independence, extreme tension existed between Odinga Odinga and Jomo Kenyatta, and 
their respective allies.  Odinga broke away from Kenyatta’s political party, the KAU, to form his own, the KPU.  
Kenyatta considered this a direct threat to his government.     
81 Keith Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya, 173.  
29 
 
one rally Ngei’s constituents “forced [Kenyatta] to end his speech early, and he had to flee 
Machakos with the windows of his car broken.”82  Such open public hostility was one issue; 
another was the efforts of Ngei and other Kenyan politicians to gain the support of the Kenya 
Rifles.83  One international observer commentated that “If Paul Ngei… were to join forces with 
Odinga against the Kenyatta government—so the argument goes—they might be able to draw 
leading elements of the Army and police to their side.”84  Such angst was created by rumors of 
improper connections between politicians and the Kenya Rifles.  M.P. Matano demonstrated this 
fear when he announced, “there are rumors circulating… that there are Members of Parliament 
who have taken people outside this country and they are now recruiting them privately to 
return… and join the army… What security arrangements are going to be made to avoid any 
clashes or any coup d’etat.”85  Parsons explains that “With roughly 170 Kenyans, most of whom 
were personally selected by Odinga and his allies, having received some sort of military training 
in the Eastern Bloc, it seemed apparent to many observers that Odinga was trying to train and 
equip his own private army.”86  More worrying was that certain members of parliament even 
tried to get these or similar trainees recruited directly into the army.87  The government was well 
aware of these real or imagined threats, and they were forced to implement policies to protect the 
KR from internal subversion.  
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 The Government of Kenya not only worried about the Kenya Rifles loyalty or reliability, 
they were also concerned about the KR’s negative effects on Kenyan society.  Even though the 
King’s African Rifles officially became the Kenya Rifles at independence, that did not mean that 
it was now a national or representative army.  It lacked sufficient indigenous officers and its 
composition was ethnically exclusive. Rather than improve or stabilize the political situation, the 
newly independent Kenya Rifles actually deteriorated it.  M.P. Ochwada observed that the 
government must change this and work to ensure that the army was not “a liability but is an asset 
for the nation.”88  The KR’s colonial attributes decreased confidence in the government, and they 
also inflamed ethnic tension, as various groups struggled to gain or defend their access to the 
Army’s patronage.  To reverse this tension and provide the stability that would allow it to 
effectively rule, the government needed the KR to address these colonial legacies.  
 The most glaring colonial aspect of the Kenya Rifles at independence, and one of the 
most destabilizing, was that indigenous Africans only made up fifty percent of the officer 
corps.89  East Africa’s colonial governments discouraged indigenous commissions and only after 
intense political pressure, and the realization that independence was on the horizon, did they 
produce their first indigenous African officer in 1957.90    M.P. Arwings-Kodhek lamented that 
there were “certain things which have really been neglected in the past… The people who were 
governing us… never arranged that we should have an officer class of the King’s African Rifles 
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which we can call upon.”91  The KR’s lack of indigenous officers not only weakened its ability to 
perform and develop, it also caused unease in Kenya, particularly in the army itself.    Less than 
two months after independence, the 11th KR joined other former KAR battalions in Tanzania and 
Uganda in the 1964 East African Army Mutinies.  While the 11th KR eventually peacefully 
returned to their barracks, the region wide event caused considerable worry in the UK and East 
African Governments.  Parsons has explored this event in detail and one of the key sources of 
early discontent in the KR was the slowness or lack of African promotion.  He states, “Most 
[indigenous soldiers] believed that expatriate British officers stood in the way of their promotion 
to higher ranks.”92  Some soldiers even “charged that British military personnel plotted to stay in 
Kenya because they would not be able to get jobs back in the United Kingdom.”93  Kenyatta was 
aware of this issue and when the mutinies were starting to break out, he immediately “announced 
plans to accelerate the Africanization of the officer corps.”94  The Government of Kenya wisely 
realized and then confronted this issue early on in its existence, and it withstood the 1964 East 
African Army Mutinies relatively well.                  
 The promotion of Africans into the officer corps was tied to another colonial legacy, the 
Kenya Rifles’ ethnic composition.  In terms of ethnic or tribal conflict in Kenya, the composition 
of the KR proved to be one of the most divisive and destabilizing issues.  Indeed, ethnic conflict 
was one of the greatest problems Kenya faced.  Anthony Swann, the Temporary Minister for 
Defence informed the Parliament of Kenya in 1962 that the “immediate threat to security today, 
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at this moment… is the very real inter-tribal tension in some parts of Kenya.”95  Britain’s martial 
race recruiting policy created an army that was highly exclusivist and a large source of political 
patronage.  Ethnic groups such as the Kalenjin and the Kamba, who had dominated the KAR 
since World War I, assumed the same position at independence.96  This created two significant 
problems.  The first is that groups with previous access to the military defended their privileged 
martial race status.  Military service had become integral in martial race communities, 
significantly influencing their economies and identities.  One Samburu (considered martial race 
by colonial authorities) veteran sergeant-major of the KAR, M.P. ole Tipis, demonstrated this 
when he explained to the house that  
We know that it is a fact that some people are better fighters than others.  Nobody can 
deny this… those people who have the greater ability, who are stronger, who can endure 
difficult conditions, people who have been brought up in semi-desert areas, not in places 
like Nairobi having an easy life all the time, people who can trek the enemy long 
distances on foot, not on bicycles, why should they be denied the chance of joining the 
army just because there have been imbalances in the past.97      
Representatives of martial race communities not only worried about their peoples’ identities, but 
also their future welfare.  M.P. Tanui wondered that “in view of the fact that the Kalenjin, the 
Turkana, and the Masai are educationally backward, is it not fair for the Government to recruit 
more people from these tribes into the army?”98  When the government did try to make the KR 
more representative, martial race communities felt targeted.  After an inquiry from M.P. Choge 
in regards to declining Kalenjin recruitment, Minister Mungai felt compelled to inform him, “We 
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have no policy of discrimination against the Kalenjin.”99  But Parsons notes how soldiers in the 
KR were uneasy and uncertain about their futures after independence.  Parsons states “Veteran 
Askaris were profoundly suspicious of their new African leaders,” because “these leaders came 
from the politically sophisticated ‘non-martial’ ethnic groups that colonial officers had barred 
from the KAR.”100  Reforming the ethnic composition of the KR would prove to be a 
complicated process as its current members feared for their futures and they posed an internal 
threat to the stability and integrity of the Kenya Rifles, the government, and Kenya in general.    
The second problem with the KR’s colonial composition is that other ethnic groups 
throughout Kenya wanted their own people to be better represented and have access to the 
army’s patronage.  Parliament members often presented motions that dealt specifically with 
ethnic or regional recruitment.  One motion titled, “Recruitment to Kenya Army and Police,” 
read “in view of the fact that the Coastal people have been neglected in the selection of Kenya 
Army and Police—particularly the Digos—this House urges the Government to distribute 
vacancies to those forces when they occur.”101  Kenya’s official parliamentary records are also 
filled with complaints and expressions of disappointment about army recruitment and the lack 
ethnic representation.  In 1963, after 300 of his people failed to gain entry into the army, a 
frustrated M.P. Oduya stated, “Now I find that this is a deliberate attempt to ignore my people in 
every appointment.”102  In 1964, M.P. Matamo complained, “The Government had a big plan of 
taking new recruits in the army.  They came to the coast, I told my constituents, everybody went 
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there, and there were between 500 and 600 people who went to be enrolled.  When they came 
out, they were able to pick up only five men.”103  
Such ambition and competition to gain access to the army often led to open hostility and 
division, if not subversion.  After a particularly heated debate about KR recruitment, M.P. Ngala 
placed blame on the government stating, “it is tribalism plus political consideration which is 
spoiling the situation… it must stop.”104  On a similar occasion, Tom Mboya defended the 
government by explaining that  
as long as we have many people wanting promotion, only one person can be selected for 
a particular post and some people are bound to be left… Those who have criticisms 
should make them in a helpful and constructive way, but it is of no use for people 
shouting ‘tribalism’ when some of them are actually talking tribalism.105   
Indeed, there is evidence that some politicians planned to replace the KR’s traditional ethnic 
groups with their own interest groups.  M.P. Kaggia, who was an important Mau Mau leader, 
played to his constituents by suggesting to the house that those who suffered or fought against 
the colonial government during the emergency “be considered by the Government and given 
priority in getting jobs especially in the police and army.”106  M.P. Godia, who had made his 
career as an advocate of the controversial KANU youth wing, even proposed that the 
government should hire 20,000 youth wingers for jobs in the police and army.107  Some 
politicians worried that policies of detribalization and Africanization were a plot to “Kikuyuize” 
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the KR.108  Interestingly, these discussions, which emphasized personal (or interest group) gain 
as opposed to the behavior and ability of the security forces, were reminiscent of the old colonial 
KAR discourse.  In order to increase confidence in the state and decrease ethnic tension, it was in 
the government’s best interest to make the KR genuinely more representative.  Minister Mungai 
illustrates this when he felt forced to confirm for parliament that “the government can give an 
unqualified assurance that it is determined not to permit tribalism to spoil its armed forces.”109  
However, at the same time, the government had to prevent dissatisfaction in its existing soldiers 
and defend against other ethnic or interest groups gaining control of the KR.  Thus, the 
Government of Kenya decided to do away with the colonial martial races, but it needed to do so 
in a delicate and judicious manner.110   
 The situation Kenya inherited upon independence not only required a loyal and more 
representative army, it also necessitated an efficient and competent army to deter the multitude 
of Kenya’s potential aggressors.  The 1960s and 1970s were tumultuous times for much of the 
African continent.  The empires of Belgium, Britain, France, and others gave way to many 
unstable, handicapped, and unpredictable independent states who faced an uphill internal battle 
with their colonial legacies.  Kenya itself had to deal with a military mutiny as well as several 
low level ethnic conflicts early on in its existence.  Many of the political disasters these states 
endured had far-reaching affects outside their borders.  Finally, the Cold War diplomatic 
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situation threatened to embroil East Africa or the continent in general.  Western and Communist 
regimes fought bloody proxy wars in several parts of Africa, much to the detriment of local 
interests.  It is this international political environment in which the Government of Kenya found 
itself at independence.  The fears and concerns this situation generated forced the government to 
ensure that the KR was an efficient and competent armed force.       
 When Kenya became independent on December 12 1963, it inherited several 
destabilizing internal ethnic conflicts that had existed throughout Britain’s colonial rule.  Many 
of these conflicts occurred in the border regions next to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Uganda, but some 
also existed in between different Kenyan ethnic groups.  While the violence of these conflicts 
was limited in nature, they were significant sources of instability.  As has already been noted, the 
Temporary Minister for Defence informed the Parliament of Kenya in 1962 that the “immediate 
threat to security today, at this moment… is the very real inter-tribal tension in some parts of 
Kenya.”111  One of the greatest sources of this tension was the Rift Valley, where the Land 
Freedom Army had been operating for some time.  M.P. Wabuge reported “the situation in the 
Rift Valley is not a pleasing one, people are being terrorized, there is the Land Freedom 
Army.”112  M.P. Odede feared such a situation could spiral out of control and he explained to the 
house that “The Land Freedom Army is a serious organization and we should deal with it… Are 
they going to fight the Kalenjin?  This might bring about what you could call civil war.”113  
Different conflicts continued to flair in other areas of Kenya.  In the same parliamentary session, 
M.P. Odede asked the government “to post a Kenya army in the Northern Frontier, so that when 
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the Merille or tribesmen from Abyssinia come to attack the Turkana they will find it not easy to 
do so, because the army can deal with them.”114  During this time period, violent conflict was 
also reported between Kenyan Masai and Kamba over cattle.115  The Government of Kenya had a 
tremendous area to cover in terms of asserting a monopolization on violent force, and some 
politicians realized the enormity of the task.  M.P. Agar recognized “we cannot afford to have 
the army or the police force all round the [northern] border: it is a difficult area, dry, 
mountainous, and I know very well that these tribes can go through the defences.”116  Kenya’s 
government inherited an ongoing internal security crisis, not to mention external conventional 
threats.            
 These tribal conflicts sometimes led to larger developments, as seen with the Shifta 
Conflict and the immense tension built up between the governments of Kenya and Somalia.117  
While cross border raids by various ethnic groups had occurred in the Kenya’s North-Eastern 
Province since the colonial period, ambiguous claims by the newly independent state of Somalia 
to unite the Somali people threatened to escalate the conflict into a full blown war.  Kenya’s 
Parliamentary record is filled with expressions of fear and concern for this development.  Even 
before independence, M.P. Arwings-Kodhek exclaimed,  
I sincerely hope that once things are settled, and after 12th December, should anybody 
tamper with the lives of Kenya people in Kenya, the government will really hit at that 
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person or nation where it will hurt most, including of course, the particular group in 
Somalia… we cannot have pan-africanism when we have dudus raiding our own areas.118     
Indeed, in the same time period, M.P. Oduya warned, “the Somali government is well equipped.  
They are buying expensive weapons and they are ready to attack Kenya at any time.  There is a 
rumor already that even on the 12th December they may interfere with our celebrations.”119  
Kenya’s government and politicians were greatly concerned that Somalia was preparing for war, 
and feared the consequences of such a development. 
   In response to the Somalian threat, the Government of Kenya became greatly concerned 
for the effectiveness of the Kenya Rifles.  Many politicians lamented the small size and 
inadequacy of the inherited KR.  Ngala told parliament, “We have 3,000 people [in the KR].  
What equipment do we have?  Do you think that 3,000 people constitute an army for a free 
country?”120  M.P Oduya observed that the KR was not “sufficient, because this army has not 
been trained… to handle these machines like the ones which are being purchased by the Somali 
Government from China, Russia, or America—they are large missile machines.”121  One very 
discouraging M.P. even told the house, “the strength of the Kenya Army is surprisingly very 
little… I was only thinking that if the weakest State in Africa invaded Kenya today, then Kenya 
would be defeated.”122  While this was certainly an exaggeration, it points to the fear and 
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helplessness some Kenyans felt with regards to the regional political situation.  The government 
was forced to respond to these threats and fears by strengthening the KR.     
 If the Government of Kenya failed to address any of its security responsibilities, it risked 
losing its monopoly on violence to non-state powers.  Such developments would challenge the 
government’s ability to rule as well as lead to increased instability.  After a series of raids began 
to get out of hand, Kamba leaders threatened to lead their tribe in war against the Masai.123  
Similarly, as the government struggled to get ahold of the Shifta Conflict, M.P. Oduya advised 
his peers to give the Prime Minister  
a list of militant chaps.  I will supply him with a list of 1,000.  We have people who can walk into this area.  
If our people are given arms and get training of one week and if we ask them to go in to Somalia, they can 
see that every Somali who causes trouble is shot.  We shall make Somalia a colony of Kenya.124      
Fortunately, neither of these scenarios materialized.  But it is important to note that such 
processes were possible, and even proposed and developed.  The Government of Kenya could 
not allow such developments without compromising its own integrity, stability, and legitimacy, 
thus it needed to ensure the ability of the KR to handle Kenya’s security needs. 
 The final reason the government needed the Kenya Rifles to be competent and efficient 
was the Cold War diplomatic situation.  The Government of Kenya relied on various secret and 
open alliances to secure its sovereignty, but it also recognized that “we should [not] rely on other 
people.  Those countries which are friendly today may decide not to be friendly tomorrow.”125  
M.P. Agar pointed out in terms of the Shifta Conflict that “I know that the British Government 
will find it very difficult to assist us after 12th December because then some British enemy might 
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say, ‘Well, if the British are assisting then we shall help Somalia.’”126  Due to the Cold War 
Kenya could not count on outright alliances or guaranteed military assistance in case of war.  
The best Kenyatta and his government would accomplish was a short-lived military alliance with 
Ethiopia, and a secret ambiguously worded commitment that the UK would look with favor upon 
Kenya in case of invasion.127  Charles Hornsby explains “the British were characteristically 
careful to leave their options open.”128  In contrast to this line of thought, Agar wisely pointed 
out that “Once this part of Africa is plunged into war or international struggle we know that our 
economic development [the Kenyatta regime’s stated ultimate goal] will not materialize.”129  
Therefore, Kenya implemented a policy of neutrality.130  In order for this neutrality to be taken 
seriously however, Kenya needed to be capable, or at least appear to be capable, of strenuously 
defending itself and its interests.  Minister Mungai stated “every nation must have its defence 
forces to guarantee its integrity and its independence.  This is particularly true in Africa today, 
and even more so in Kenya.”131  M.P. Odinga Odinga echoed this sentiment, exclaiming that 
when Kenya gained independence “we must defend our own freedom… we must do so, we must 
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do so.”132  Kenya’s Cold War policy forced the government to ensure that the KR was efficient 
and capable.          
* 
 Upon independence, the Government of Kenya inherited an unstable and precarious 
political situation.  Internal and external threats created fear and angst, and in the interest of its 
ability to rule the government was forced to respond.  Due to its colonial legacies and the 
situation at independence, the Kenya Rifles were initially ill trusted and prepared to individually 
deal with Kenya’s internal and external security threats.  The KR was even considered a threat to 
the state, as well as a factor in increasing instability.  To deal with these issues Kenya’s 
government sought to ensure the Kenya Rifles’ loyalty, reliability, and effectiveness.         
 
Chapter 3: Backwards to the Future 
The situation Kenya inherited upon independence created a sense of urgency for 
reforming the Kenya Rifles.  The Government of Kenya needed to act quickly in order to 
establish and secure the loyalty and efficiency of the KR, as well as to end many of its negative 
effects on Kenyan society and order.  But its efforts were constrained by a myriad of factors.  
Not only did independent Kenya’s starting environment necessitate extreme political and ethnic 
sensitivity, it also called for resources outside Kenya’s disposal.  Kenya could not financially 
afford to expand the KR, nor did it have the expertise and infrastructure to rapidly Africanize the 
officer corps or train new enlistees and NCOs.  Importantly, most potential sources of 
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international military aid were limited, inadequate, or ill fitted.  Because of this, the Government 
of Kenya pragmatically and flexibly decided to pursue and take advantage of British military 
assistance, in order to address the unique needs of the Kenya Rifles.  This line of action provided 
the stability and set the stage for the future development of an organic national army. 
This chapter details how British military assistance helped Kenya ensure the loyalty, 
reliability, and effectiveness of the Kenya Rifles.  It begins by showing how possible assistance 
from other international sources was insufficient.  In contrast, the UK was not only willing to 
help, Kenya was able to increase and maximize its flow of aid.  The chapter then describes how 
British military assistance was well fitted to the Kenya Rifles.  This was due to British officer’s 
values and motivations, experience in Kenya and the KAR, and desire to genuinely help the KR.  
Finally, the chapter analyzes the consequences of continued British connections.  It argues that 
British military influences were important for maintaining the reliability and effectiveness of the 
KR.  These influences were also important in enabling the future development of an organic 
military culture and institution.     
Despite the government’s desire to expand and strengthen the KR, it could hardly afford 
to maintain the KR’s original budget.  In 1962, Anthony Swann reminded Kenya’s parliament 
“that the entire cost of the King’s African Rifles at the moment is met by Her Majesty’s 
Government, and after independence it will have to be met by this Government… As my hon. 
Friend, the Minister of Finance, has already stated, the country is bankrupt.”133  As it turned out, 
the government was not able to come up with the funds and Minister Gichuru reported a year 
later that £547,000 of the KR’s yearly budget had partly “been covered by a British Government 
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grant.”134  Kenya’s government could not reform the KR in the desired way without financial 
assistance.   
Kenya also did not have the infrastructure or personnel resources to expand, strengthen, 
and modernize the Kenya Rifles.  M.P Oduya observed that the KR was not “sufficient, because 
this army has not been trained… to handle these machines like the ones which are being 
purchased by the Somali Government… they are large missile machines.”135  Kenya did not have 
the technical ability or expertise to develop its army in such a way.  J.M. Lee explained that in 
the process of Africanizing militaries “it is difficult to find sufficiently able technicians and 
N.C.O.s to take over fairly complicated clerical work and maintenance duty.  The quartermaster-
sergeant was harder to replace than the second lieutenant.”136  Developing the KR was more than 
just promoting indigenous members and changing its ethnic composition.  Mboya told the house, 
“what we need is not just people in uniform but an effective Army, properly trained and well 
disciplined and effective in every respect… it is not just a question of overnight promotion.”137  
Many of Kenya’s politicians felt that without assistance their security concerns would be 
hopeless, especially with regards to aggressive neighbors.  M.P. Khalif told the house that the 
KR “would be very badly defeated unless Kenya relies on other powers like Britain and other 
imperialist powers.”138  The Government of Kenya also believed that quickest way to Africanize 
and expand their forces was through international assistance.  After training arrangements with 
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the UK had been made, Mungai explained, “we are committed to Africanizing the army as 
rapidly as possible [so] the only people we are going to have next year will be the British training 
team.”139  In order to reform the KR in a timely, effective, and responsible manner, Kenya 
needed to seek outside assistance.   
 When Kenya achieved independence, there were no absolute guarantees of long-term 
assistance from the United Kingdom, or any other international power.  While the UK had 
considerable interests in Kenya, it itself was under financial strain as it balanced decolonizing its 
empire and finishing World War II reconstruction.  With the loss of its East Asian and Indian 
holdings, Kenya was of much less strategic importance for the UK, and some British 
governmental officials discouraged sacrificing much-needed funds in order to assist Kenya.  
Other international powers also had a somewhat aloof outlook.  Parsons states that although the 
United States had the resources, “the Johnson administration considered the region a British 
sphere of influence,” and decided not to interfere.140  While China and Russia did try to entice 
Kenya, Parsons explains, “Eastern Bloc nations were happy to offer vast quantities of outdated 
military equipment, but could not provide enough financial assistance.”141  Eventually, Kenya 
would pursue and take advantage of British military aid, but that was not inevitable.  
 Kenya not only accepted British military assistance, it pursued and took advantage of it.  
As has already been noted, aid from the United Kingdom to the Kenya Rifles was not a 
guarantee.  When Kenya did agree to accept British assistance, Kenya’s government manipulated 
the situation in such a way as to extract as much as possible from the UK for minimal 
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concessions.  Kenya implemented a public policy in which it would accept foreign aid and 
purchase foreign arms based on what suited Kenya best, and not international politics.  M.P. 
Anyieni advised parliament that “To advance our neutral position we should learn from the East 
what is good in the form of defence and from the West what is good in the form of defence.”142  
Mungai, who was Minister for Internal Security and Defence at the time, stated “the Kenya 
Government is not limited to buying weapons and ammunition from any particular country; 
whether the country be communist or not, capitalist or not… we are going to purchase them if 
the price is right.”143  Kenyatta’s government used this position, being open to both East and 
West, to leverage British fears of the spread of communism.  Many significant Kenyan 
politicians were Marxist oriented, particularly Odinga Odinga, and they encouraged greater 
connections to the East.  Parsons explains “it is quite likely that Kenyatta used Odinga’s Eastern 
Bloc connections to push Britain into increasing its aid to Kenya.”144  Informatively, Kenya’s 
sporadic flirtations with Soviet or Chinese interests corresponded with new and improved 
packages of aid from the UK.145  Parsons also explains that Kenyatta was willing to be 
“‘reasonable’ about protecting the interests of non-African [settler and immigrant] communities 
to increase the flow of British economic and military aid.”146  Kenya was able to maximize the 
amount of aid offered from the UK by manipulating British fears and interests. 
 The Government of Kenya was also attracted to British military assistance because 
British officers shared some of the same ideals and visions for the KR as Kenyan politicians.  As 
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has been noted in Chapter one, British KAR officers were inspired or motivated by ‘imperial’ 
ideals or forms of discourse, as opposed to the ‘colonial’.  They worked to make the KAR a 
professional, prestigious, and modern conventional force capable of defending the empire from 
outside threats.  They did not want it used for internal control or domination.  After 
independence, this process of thought only changed slightly, as British officers now wanted the 
KR to be a positive testament to Britain’s imperial legacy.  Anthony Swann, Temporary Minister 
for Defence and former KAR officer, told Kenya’s parliament that contemporary British KAR 
officers 
felt that they could leave the running of the King’s African Rifles in African hands with 
total confidence.  It was a sense of pride in an achievement that this had been the mission 
of those in charge of the King’s African Rifles for 50 years, this was the ultimate aim, 
that they would move the great tradition of the King’s African Rifles into the hands of 
Kenya’s own people with total confidence… I wish sometimes, though I saw this source 
of pride in all branches of the retiring authority.”147   
In other words, British KAR officers did not want the efforts, sacrifices, and developments of the 
past fifty years to be in vain.  Because of this, many British officers easily transferred their 
loyalty and devotion from the KAR to the KR.  They continued to champion a professional and 
effective KR over other competing interests, even over the interests of the UK itself.  Edward 
Peck, the British High Commissioner, complained that one seconded officer, General Robert B. 
Penfold, was “proving a harder bargainer on behalf of Kenya than the Kenyans themselves.”148  
Parson explains, “officials in the Commonwealth Relations Office tried to keep Brigadier 
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Penfold from knowing how much money was available for Kenyan aid.”149  These British officer 
ideals and traits were attractive to many Kenyan politicians. 
While Kenya’s politicians generally sought to completely Africanize the officer corps 
and do away with martial race, they did share some ‘imperial’ ideals for the KR with British 
officers.  They rejected the argument that they only needed paramilitary or police forces.  They 
liked the idea of having a respectable and even prestigious force representing Kenya.  Mboya 
told parliament “Kenya wants to be proud of an army that is effective, an army that suits and fits 
into the modern concept of the army, that we all, I am sure, have in mind.”150  This sentiment 
was echoed by M.P Kariuki who stated, “I hope we all appreciate that as an emerging country we 
are committed most strongly to the building of a modern army in this country with all its modern 
paraphernalia.”151  Parliamentary Secretary arap Bonnett agreed even further with British officer 
ideals when he insisted that it was “very important” to “have people [in the army] who are very, 
very hounerable… we do not want people who will let down Kenya.”152  Kenyan politicians also 
shared British officer disdain for internal control oriented forces.  For example, M.P. Anyieni 
proposed to the house, “in Kenya there are too many policemen… to terrorize our people… I feel 
that is a complete waste of money.  Instead of that, we should have this money put into another 
channel… the Army.”153 British officers ran into more opposition from the Kenyan colonial 
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government in implementing their visions for the KAR than they did from the independent 
Government of Kenya.  
Kenyan politicians not only agreed with certain British officer ideals, many also 
genuinely respected the British military, and they did not see its assistance as necessarily 
problematic.  While they were eager to see the empire end, they also had some appreciation for 
the KAR, its history, and the individual connections between British and indigenous KR soldiers.  
They had reason to hold British military aid to the KR in special regard.  In one parliamentary 
session right before formal independence, Mboya told the speaker, “I hope, Sir, that no one in 
this House will fail to pay tribute to the Army, the K.A.R. for what it has done in the past and for 
the efforts that are being made within it at the moment.  I believe that we can be rightly proud of 
our K.A.R. and all its personal and officers.”154  In a similar situation, M.P. arap Moi 
remembered that “those who fought in these two World Wars believed genuinely that they were 
fighting for the right cause.”155  He would later state, “people in the Rift Valley Region will 
continue to have Remembrance Day for those who lost their lives, even after independence.”156  
Anti-imperialist politicians such as M.P. Oduya conceded to such sentiments, stating, “They 
were not only defending the soil of Kenya… They were also defending British international 
policy.”157  This understanding of British military legacies was important because it recognized 
that continued British assistance was not necessarily negative.  Even Odinga Odinga, influential 
Marxist oriented politician, recognized this when he told parliament “that what is most important 
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is first of all to Africanize the policy of the Army before we make it black-faced.”158  To bring 
this argument further, M.P Mwendwa told parliament “I want to know… where there is a black 
policy in the Army or a white policy in the Army?  I thought, Mr. Speaker, the Army was there 
to defend whether it is a white or black Army, it is there to defend the county.”159  Some Kenyan 
politicians even went so far as to propose that the British military take care of Kenya’s security 
problems such as the Land Freedom Army and Shifta.160  Many of Kenya’s politicians and 
leaders had positive (or at least neutral) opinions of the British military and thus they had little 
problem with its continued presence in the form of aid.           
Another reason British military assistance was implemented was because it helped 
stabilize the Kenya Rifles.  This was primarily due to the close personal and institutional 
relationships between seconded British officers, many of whom were KAR veterans, and KR 
soldiers and promoted officers.  While the KR did experience serious unrest due to slow rates of 
promotion, Kenyatta largely addressed this problem in 1964.  By removing seconded British 
officers from operational commands to temporary training units, Kenyatta opened up the force to 
indigenous African officers.  Essentially, he created new commands or increased the number of 
officers without having to eliminate significant portions of expatriate officers.  This can be seen 
when Kenyatta promoted Joseph Ndolo to General of the Army (now a defunct position), while 
moving the previous British general to the new position of Chief of Staff.161  The presence of 
British officers allowed the KR’s hurried Africanization process to be less destabilizing.  Many 
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of Kenya’s new officers had risen rapidly through the ranks at an unprecedented rate, much to 
the concern of Kenya’s governmental officials.162  British officers helped guide these men as 
they learned and became accustomed to their new roles.  KR soldiers could have similarly 
challenging demands of their African officers as KAR soldiers had of their European officers, so 
it was important that new officers had the time and example to adapt.163   
British seconded officers to the KR, many of whom were KAR veterans, could also have 
a stabilizing impact with the rank-and-file.  As has been noted previously, many KAR officers 
genuinely cared for and had good relations with their African soldiers.  Most of them spoke 
Swahili, knew about their soldiers’ personal lives, assisted them with personal and financial 
advice even into retirement, helped retired soldiers find employment, and would later personally 
raise funds for impoverished African KAR veterans.164  KAR soldiers remained in contact with 
their officers, entrusted them with important roles (such as treasurer of veteran associations), and 
even named their children after them.165  This dynamic was important for maintaining morale 
and discipline during the KR’s early years.  British officers also helped keep the politicization of 
the KR in check.  Kenyatta trusted seconded British officers to remain professional and loyal to 
the government.  It was expected that potential subversive plots would be impossible to carry 
out, or uncovered by expatriate officers.   Senior British military officials encouraged their 
officers to be used as such an asset.166  Seconded British officers helped stabilize the KR and 
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protect it from political subversion while it reformed, and they provided an example and a level 
of experience that otherwise would have been immediately unattainable. 
The relative stability and lack of subversive activity in the Kenya Rifles during the 
precarious 1960s is a testament to the stabilizing power of seconded British officers.  While 
many other African countries suffered military coups and dictatorships during this time, the KR 
refrained from interfering in Kenya’s civil politics.  This is especially remarkable considering the 
various reforms the KR underwent during these early years.  As noted in chapter two, the 
Government of Kenya needed to Africanize the officer corps and make the composition of the 
KR more representative.  This was problematic because it caused tension and even unrest within 
the army and certain ethnic communities.  But Kenyatta’s government completely accomplished 
the first task and made significant progress on the second without causing rebellion within the 
KR.  While at independence only 50 percent of the KR’s officers were Kenyan, the last seconded 
British officer in the KR left Kenya by 1969.167  This was an extremely rapid process and it 
could not have been carried out without stability or British training assistance.  Similarly, in 
1959, due to martial race recruiting practices, the ethnic composition of the Kenyan KAR was 
highly irregular relative to the civilian population.  While only accounting for 22 percent of the 
civilian population, the Kamba and Kalenjin made up two thirds of the force.  But 10 years later, 
this proportion had been cut down to 42 percent.  The Kikuyu, despite being Kenya’s largest 
ethnic group at around 20 percent of the total population, accounted for only 3.4 percent of the 
KAR in 1959.  But by 1969, their proportion had increased to 13 percent.  While this progress 
may seem incomplete, it was significant for Africa’s post-colonial coup prone environment.  
Interestingly, in 1969, Kenyatta finally felt sufficiently confident in the KR to shift its 
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recruitment policy from ethnic to regional quotas.168  It is important to note that other Kenya 
military institutions such as the GSU, AP, and Presidential Guard remained highly imbalanced in 
favor of the Kikuyu.169  British military assistance enabled the Government of Kenya to carry out 
these reforms without sacrificing the loyalty, reliability, or efficiency of the KR.     
Ethnic Composition of KAR before Independence170 
Ethnic Group Percentage of Army, 1959 Percentage of Kenyan 
Population, 1962 
Kamba 36.3 11.2 
Kalenjin 25.8 10.7 
Samburu 3.6 0.6 
Northern Frontier Pastoralists 11.6 6.1 
Maasai 0.6 1.8 
“Unspecified” 9.0 29.0 
Luo 9.7 13.7 
Kikuyu, Embu, & Meru 3.4 26.9 
 
Ethnic Composition of Kenya Rifles in 1969171 
Ethnic Group Percentage of Army, 1969 Percentage of Kenyan 
Population, 1969 
Kamba 21.4 11.2 
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Kalenjin 20.8 9.5 
Luo 13.7 10.1 
Kikuyu 13.1 19.6 
Luhya 13.0 9.9 
Other 18.0 39.7 
      
 British military assistance was also well adapted to Kenya’s strategic needs.  Due to its 
extensive knowledge and experience, the British Army was the foremost authority on East 
African military issues.  The British Empire had long been concerned with operating in the 
region, and the UK retained that insight.  Even with the dissolution of its empire, the British 
military remained interested in the developments of the region and the continent.  For example, 
in 1961, W. F. Gutteridge, a Sandhurst professor, was sent by the War Office to make a “detailed 
study of ‘The place of the Army in emergent states in Commonwealth Africa with special 
reference to the social and educational background of recruits.’”172  Gutteridge traveled through 
most of former British Africa, including Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.173  His research and 
presentations influenced the understandings of both British and international officers and 
cadets.174  Likewise, in 1967, J. M. Lee was commissioned by the Institute for Strategic Studies 
to write African Armies and Civil Order.  This work, describing the issues post-colonial African 
militaries face, has remained influential to this day.  The British military also remained 
concerned about African military tactics.  One 1960s military training exercise held in the 
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mountains of Portugal for Sandhurst cadets was specifically designed to prepare for operations 
which had “caught the Army somewhat unprepared in the years following the Second World 
War-in Kenya.”175  No other army at the time was as experienced, knowledgeable, or focused on 
East African military affairs as the British Army. 
 The prestige and nature of British officer training also greatly attracted Kenya’s 
government.  As shown above, the British military had a wide range of information and 
experiences concerning East Africa.  This knowledge was passed on to officer cadets, 
particularly at Sandhurst, to which Kenya was given generous access.176  Several instructors and 
professors were even KAR and KR veterans.  For example, Lt. Col A.P.H. Hartley commanded 
the 5th Battalion of the King’s African Rifles from 1961-1964.  In 1964 he was appointed a 
Sandhurst training command, where he would have been in contact with several Kenyan cadets 
such as G.K. Kinuthia, D.N. Masai, Bernard Kiilu, and John Musomba, to name a few.177  British 
cadet training was also starting to take on more of an international focus.178  Whereas the Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst had originally been focused on European and imperial concerns, 
after World War II and the end of empire, it began to cater to the international community. It 
became renown internationally as a prestigious investiture for young men (and women in 1981), 
attracting gifted cadets and future military leaders, not to mention the children of royalty and 
presidents, from across the world.179  As such, many Sandhurst cadets not only rubbed shoulders 
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with many prominent people from Africa and abroad, they were also exposed to the ideas and 
challenges their international peers faced.  Cadets would study subjects such as Indianization, 
Africanization, Pan-Africanism, and “the peculiar and local characteristics of” African, Asian, 
and Middle Eastern nationalism and politics.180  Many Kenyan cadets would cherish their time 
and remain in contact with their Sandhurst peers, and such connections could have important 
impacts on individual careers.181   
One of the most attractive aspects of British officer training was its values and ethics.  
The Government of Kenya primarily desired the Kenya Rifles to be loyal, reliable, and 
professional, and British officer values and training accommodated this.  While many aspects of 
the British military changed after World War II and the end of empire, some of its ideals did not.  
General Lathbury, at a Sandhurst graduation speech, laid out what he believed to be the core 
characteristics of a good military officer, whether British or international; 
I will begin by saying how glad I am to see the many officer cadets from a broad, 
particularly those from the Commonwealth and newly independent nations... You will 
have a very important part to play in the development of your own Armed Forces and I 
hope that what you have learned here will be of benefit to you…  There are important 
social changes too which are, of course, a reflection of our national life.  But certain 
things have not changed nor will they while armies remain; and amongst these are the 
characteristics required of a good officer. The first requirement is professional 
competence... The second is the ability to lead the men whom you will have the honour to 
command. Professional skill will help here too, for ability always commands respect... 
With it must go determination and a real and human understanding of the soldiers you 
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will lead. Of course there are many other qualities which we should all like to possess. 
But it seems to me that those few I have mentioned are the ones that really matter.182 
Such values corresponded well to the Government of Kenya’s vision, as noted previously, and 
thus government officials believed that British officer training and development would be useful 
for successfully operating the Kenya Rifles.  Indeed, many of Kenya’s greatest KR generals 
would be characterized by these or similar traits. 
 Positive influences from British officer values and training were evident early on.  After 
independence, Kenyan KR officers and soldiers strived to maintain and even increase the force’s 
discipline and effectiveness.  Parsons explains that Kenyan KR officers on selection boards  
had even higher standards than their British predecessors.  Where British officers had 
been willing to excuse minor defects to accelerate the Africanization process, African 
examiners now downgraded candidates for poor discipline, sloppy appearance, laziness, 
and weak social skills.183  
The Government of Kenya encouraged this spirit and they implemented policies that “sought to 
keep politics out of the commissioning process.”184  British officer influence and KR 
professionalism was also recognized in the Shifta Conflict.  While both sides committed 
atrocities, the KR largely distinguished itself as a respectable institution.185  A.S. Khalif, a M.P 
from the embattled North-East Region, praised Major Wambua and his KR soldiers for reigning 
in the abuses of the GSU and saving the lives of “innocent and loyal Somalis.”186  He told 
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parliament that Wambua “had no alternative, but to bring his army troops to Wajir township, to 
stop the General Service Unit Platoon killing the loyal Somalis.”187  British Army officer 
observers who accompanied Kenyan military units in the Shifta conflict had similar effects as 
they criticized and discouraged “trigger happy” actions.188  Parsons explains the outcome of 
these developments; “The successful campaign against the Shifta on the northern frontier led the 
Kenyan public to see the soldiers as defenders of the nation.  The army’s strong reputation 
reaffirmed its commitment to professionalism.”189     
 The positive effects of the continued relationship between the Kenya Rifles and the 
British military during the 1960s were also demonstrated in later years.  Exceptional future 
leaders of the Kenya Rifles, who entered the military during this time, received training from and 
had important personal connections with British army officers and institutions.  British trained 
Kenyan officers had significant roles in maintaining the reliability of the KR and thwarting coup 
attempts in 1971 and 1982, neither of which infected the army.  While Katumanga characterizes 
the KR of the 1960s as “inclined towards regime consolidation rather than deterrence for fending 
off external aggression,” the only two KR officers he later recognizes as positively influencing 
Kenya’s military institution and culture both entered the army and received their training and 
commissions during this time.190 General Daudi Tonje and General Elijah Sumbeiywo are 
eminent examples of Kenyan officers who made important positive contributions in the 
maintenance of professionalism, and the development of an organic military culture in the Kenya 
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Rifles.  Both entered the KR and received British officer training through British military schools 
and other avenues during the 1960s.  The coup attempts of 1971 and 1982, as well as the careers 
of Tonje and Sumbeiywo, provide strong evidence for a correlation between noteworthy 
professional Kenyan officers and 1960s’ British military influence.   
 Many aspects of the coup attempt or conspiracy of 1971 demonstrate the professionalism 
and reliability of the Kenya Rifles.  While the details of the plot are vague, twelve men were 
arrested for planning to overthrow the government, none of whom were KR members.  General 
Joseph Ndolo, who was later reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with the Kenyatta 
Regime, was only loosely related to the plot.191  But rumors suggesting the army was involved 
shocked and alarmed Kenyan society, a testament to the generally good public reputation the KR 
had enjoyed.192 The plot was significant because it involved many important Kamba individuals, 
an ethnic group who still made up a large proportion of the KR.  Yet the force remained loyal to 
its values and the government throughout.  One Kamba General, Jackson Mulinge, “pledged to 
Kenyatta the army's undivided loyalty and assured him that the newspaper reports to the effect 
that the country's armed forces were in any way involved in a plot to overthrow his government 
were ‘completely untrue and unfounded.’”193  Mulinge had enormous exposure to the British 
military.  He joined the KAR in 1942, fought in Malaysia during World War II, was promoted to 
warrant officer in 1952, and was the first Kenyan to receive the Queen’s commission in 1961.194  
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The Daily Nation explains “His military education was entirely British. He attended command 
and staff course there in 1962 and 1968 and was adjudged diligent enough to be awarded the 
Distinguished Conduct Order among other decorations.”195  On the 1971 coup plot, Parsons 
states that Mulinge’s “reasons for refusing to be party to a political conspiracy reflect both the 
high code of professionalism that the British had tried to instill in the Kenyan Army and a 
pragmatic assessment of the risky nature of African coups.”196  Mulinge later explained that KR 
participation in the coup would create a military culture or discourse of “an endless power game 
whose end result is death and more deaths.”197  While neighboring governments struggled to 
control their militaries, Kenya largely avoided this with army leaders like Mulinge.198  He 
encapsulated the professionalism and reliability the British military could help provide, and the 
desire the Government of Kenya had for its forces.  Mulinge later explained, “For me the army 
was the army, and I was there to obey the commands of my superiors and serve my country with 
dedication.”199     
 The air force coup attempt of 1982 also demonstrates the long-term positive nature of 
continued KR connections with the British military.  Claiming intolerable corruption and poor 
economic conditions, junior air force members staged a military takeover as they seized key 
government buildings on August 1st.200  Described as “one of Kenya’s darkest moments,” senior 
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army officers led loyalist forces in successfully ending the coup.201  As in 1971, Mulinge was 
also instrumental in foiling the plot and dealing with the aftermath.  But other British trained 
Kenyan officers played more direct roles.  General Bernard Kiilu, General John Musomba, and 
Colonel Alex Mwangangi were all Sandhurst graduates who were important in terminating the 
coup.  Kiilu graduated from Sandhurst in 1965 and is described as “a British-trained officer with 
a fine intellectual mind.”202 He assisted Generals Mohammed and Shaw in organizing a 
counterattack and successfully removing the rebels from one of their main positions, the Voice 
of Kenya radio station.203  Musomba, the commandant of the 3rd KR, entered Sandhurst in 1964 
and graduated two years later, having achieved considerable success as vice-captain of the 
athletics team.204  He was given the important task of securing the safety of President Moi and 
transporting him to Nairobi.205  He did so successfully.     
However, the most interesting connection between the British military and Kenyan 1982 
counter-coup efforts is the actions of Mwangangi.206  Mwangangi graduated from Sandhurst in 
1969 and was promoted to head of the military police in the late 1970s.207  He maintained his 
relationship with the British military, and they warned him directly of a possible coup attempt in 
1980.  Interestingly, this British intelligence was provided by Kenyan cadets studying in England 
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at the time.  Mwangangi was aware of these developments, and he took the necessary steps in 
informing the government and preparing a response.  While the Moi regime’s reaction to this 
warning is not well documented, the relationship between Kenyan cadets, the British military, 
and Colonel Mwangangi in opposing the takeover is significant in itself.208  Many of the KR 
officers who were responsible for preventing the 1982 military coup had important British 
connections and training.     
 General Daudi Tonje is a prominent example of a British trained and influenced KR 
officer who made immense positive impacts on Kenya’s military institution and culture.  
Katumanga praises him for initiating “the first major revolution in Kenya’s military affairs.”209  
While Katumanga is extremely critical of the KR and its British connections and legacies in the 
1960s-1980s, he fails to recognize that Tonje entered the King’s African Rifles in 1962 and had 
extensive British training.  After attending Mons Officer Cadet School in England, Tonje 
received the Queen’s commission in 1963.210 He subsequently participated in peaceably quelling 
the Kenyan segment of the 1964 Army Mutinies, alongside seconded British officers.211  He then 
was influential in developing the Military Academy of Kenya, and he would come to be seen as a 
keen British trained academic and reformer.212  Tonje, “informed by moral courage and a grasp 
of national interest,” Katumanga explains, “sought to ‘revolt’ against the existing culture and 
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doctrine.”213  Beset by falling standards in discipline and professionalism in the 1990s, Tonje 
“asked to be given a free hand in ridding the armed forces of tribal influences before he accepted 
the appointment as chief of the general staff [in 1996].”214  He reformed the Military of Kenya’s 
strategic outlook, command structure, procurement methods, educational requirements, and 
retirement age.215  Many of these reforms were based off British doctrine, but uniquely adapted 
to Kenya’s needs.216  With his commitment to integrity and other traditional officer values, Tonje 
“made Kenya's military to be seen as one of the most professional in Africa as exemplified by 
the number of invitations by the United Nations for Kenya troops to assist in peace-keeping 
missions abroad.”217  He is widely referenced as one of the most important generals in Kenya’s 
history.218 
 General Lazaro Sumbeiywo is another example of an important British trained Kenyan 
officer.  He was appointed Commander of the Army in 2000, immediately after Tonje’s tenure as 
Chief of General Staff.  Like Tonje, Katumanga also praises Sumbeiywo for playing a “positive 
role” in Kenya’s military discourse.219  His influence on military culture and development would 
spread beyond Kenya’s borders.  Sumbeiywo, the son of a KAR corporal, joined the KR in 
1968.220  After excelling in academic tests, he was sent to Sandhurst, where he received his 
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commission on July 30, 1970.221  He excelled and made many important connections at the 
academy, captaining the athletics team and winning the prestigious silver-bugle award.222  
Motivated by “rigid” principles of discipline, loyalty, and integrity, he rose through the ranks 
quickly, especially after helping quell the aforementioned 1982 air force coup attempt.223  He 
would go on to be promoted to Commander of the Army, where he had the difficult task of 
implementing General Tonje’s reforms and mediating the Darfur Conflict.  He maintained his 
connections with the British Army, attending the Royal College of Defence in the UK in 1998, 
and taking an official visit to Sandhurst on June 23, 1999.224  While in the UK, he contemplated 
various peacekeeping problems in Sudan as he wrote his thesis, “The Dilemma of the Horn of 
Africa.”225  Sumbeiywo would go onto play the foremost role in establishing peace between 
Sudan and South Sudan.226  He is widely acclaimed as one of today’s most successful 
peacemakers.  He is proud his efforts “because I served in this noble profession with honour and 
dignity. This should be the aspiration of every officer in uniform.”227  While British officer 
influence and training are apparent Sumbeiywo’s qualities, it should also be noted that some of 
his practices are in stark contrast to British dogma, which is further evidence for the development 
of a unique and organic military culture.228    
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* 
 Kenya had to overcome many problems upon its independence.  It especially needed to 
address its security needs, and ensure the loyalty, reliability, and effectiveness of the Kenya 
Rifles.  But the Government of Kenya did not have the financial resources, expertise, and 
infrastructure to accomplish this task during the 1960s.  Thus, it sought aid from the international 
community.  Eventually, Kenyatta’s government pragmatically decided to accept and pursue 
British military assistance.  This was partially due to Kenya’s ability to manipulate British 
interests and maximize aid.  But it was also because the British military was uniquely positioned 
to assist the KR.  British officer values, experience, strategic knowledge, and genuine concern 
for the KR was desirable to Kenyan government officials.  Continued British military influence 
would prove to be beneficial.  The KR was loyal and professional throughout the tumultuous 
1960s.  This remained true in later years, particular in the 1971 and 1982 coup attempts.  Kenyan 
officers, who had received extensive British training and influence during the 1960s, were 
important in these efforts.  Such officers were also essential in creating an organic military 
culture and further developing the KR.  By taking advantage of British military assistance, the 
Government of Kenya was enabled to expand the KR, maintain its loyalty and effectiveness, and 
build a principled and professional officer corps which could eventually be relied on to operate 
independently.              
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Conclusion 
 The continued relationship between the Kenya Rifles and the British military is a 
controversial issue due to the historical legacies of colonialism in East Africa.  Many observers 
have condemned this development due to concerns of neo-colonialism and dependency.  They 
see continued British presence, especially during the 1960s, as maintaining the colonial status 
quo.  It is true, that historical legacies are important for discerning post-colonial developments.  
But the legacies of colonialism in Kenya are complex, especially regarding the Kenya Rifles.  In 
order to understand the KR’s transition after independence and its relationship with the British 
military, it is necessary to identify the dynamics of its predecessor.    
 The King’s African Rifles was a multifaceted and constantly changing institution.  
Originating at the end of the 19th century, it would evolve dramatically as various interests 
struggled for influence.  Of particular importance was the conflict between colonial and imperial 
discourses.  The colonial discourse, which sought to maintain an inexpensive and unprofessional 
paramilitary force, was motivated by desire for conquest, domination, and economic extraction.  
This was opposed to idealist imperial forms of discourse, which sought to build a formidable and 
prestigious imperial force.  British officers, who were immersed in ideals of honor and duty, 
championed this imperial vision.  The international conflicts of the 20th century and the 
persistence of devoted officers enabled the KAR to increasingly become a professional, 
effective, and conventional military institution.  Indigenous soldiers also influenced the KAR.  
They acculturated various military values and practices, negotiated their terms of service, and 
shaped the behavior of their officers.  Because of these factors, the KAR that Kenya inherited at 
independence should not be understood as purely colonial, but rather the result of a mix of 
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influences.  The legacy of competing colonial, imperial, and indigenous discourses was an 
important aspect in the Kenya Rifles. 
 The situation Kenya inherited at independence greatly constrained its possible actions.  
Kenya could not afford to completely disband the KAR, nor could it immediately focus on 
building an organic military culture for the Kenya Rifles.  Instead, it first needed to ensure the 
KR’s reliability, loyalty, and effectiveness.  This partially entailed ending the KR’s martial race 
composition and Africanizing the officer corps.  These measures were necessary due to the range 
of internal and external threats the Government of Kenya faced.  In addition, various individual 
and ideological interests desired to gain access to or control the KR for political or economic 
reasons.  Most of these interests were not concerned for the actual performance and mindset of 
the force.  This was reminiscent of the KAR’s colonial discourse.  It is in this environment which 
the Government of Kenya sought solutions for its security dilemma. 
 In order to ensure the loyalty, reliability, and effectiveness of the Kenya Rifles, or to 
carry out any of the desired reforms, the Government of Kenya needed international assistance.  
While Kenya had options, the British military proved to be the best suited to help provide for the 
KR’s unique needs.  British officers were familiar with Kenya and the KR, knowledgeable of 
African security issues, and highly motivated to build a positive legacy of the KAR and the 
British Empire.  In addition, British officer ideals and vision for the KR corresponded well with 
many Kenyan politicians.  They too, desired to make the KR professional, formidable, and 
worthy of national pride.   
 The Kenyatta regime’s strategy of taking advantage of British military assistance paid 
off.  Unlike many other African states, the KR did not intervene in civil politics during the 
1960s, or any time after.  Instead, it played eminent roles in extinguishing the coup attempts of 
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1971 and 1982.  It remained loyal, reliable, professional, and effective.  1960s’ British trained 
and influenced Kenyan KR officers were particularly important in these efforts.  Individuals like 
General Tonje and General Sumbeiywo went onto reform the KR and develop an organic 
military culture.   
British military assistance was important in these developments.  As during the colonial 
period, British officers were motivated by high ideals, which have been categorized in this thesis 
as imperial.  While the independent Government of Kenya could not tolerate the presence of 
foreign British officers within its own forces in perpetuity, nor the peculiar theories of martial 
race recruiting those same officers originally implemented, the government did take advantage of 
some of their ideals and inspirations.  In effect, they maintained the KAR’s imperial discourse in 
the KR during the 1960s.  The power vacuum independence created meant that the old colonial 
discourse continued to exist in Kenya, as evidenced by the various interests trying to gain control 
of the KR.  By maintaining the imperial discourse of loyalty, professionalism, and prestige, first 
through seconded officers and then through properly motivated and trained indigenous officers, 
independent Kenya caused this colonial discourse to be stifled.  The KR was thus enabled to 
transition, evolve, and stabilize.  KR officers who received training and commissions in the 
1960s were allowed to remain and mature in a relatively stable environment.   These conditions 
were important for the efforts of Tonje and Sumbeiywo as they moved the KR towards an 
organic national military culture and institution. 
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